The year 2024 in Ukraine : from Pokrovsk to Kursk
(Abstract) In 2024, the Russian war against Ukraine saw significant developments, particularly in the area of Pokrovsk in the Donbas and Kursk region in Russia. The front line, however, has changed only little. Both sides have tried to strengthen their positions in preparation for possible negotiations in 2025.
Article wrote for Ukraine Analysen, translated in german by Eduard Klein
The Russian offensive south of Donetsk as the main event of 2024
In October 2023, after 5 months of Ukrainian initiative in the south and on Bakhmut flanks, Russian armed forces launched a large offensive in the whole south-Donetsk direction. Thus, most of the active fighting of 2024 occurred in the south of Donetsk oblast, from Avdiivka to Pokrovsk. This large battle should be called the “Donetsk battle”, because its strategic objectives were to secure the suburbs of the once one million inhabitant city. In January and February 2024, Russia captured the strategic town of Avdiivka. Avdiivka is located just 5 kilometers north of Donetsk, highly fortified since 2014 and was used to attack Russian forces in the northern and western parts of Donetsk city.
Russia’s Donetsk offensive was organized in three main axes. The first and biggest was in Avdiivka, with two supportive axes, one in the Krasnohorivka/Marinka-Kourakhove axis, along the Donetsk-Zaporizhia highway and one in the Novomykhailivka-Vuhledar axis. After securing Avdiivka, Russian forces rushed along the Donetsk-Pokrovsk railway. They first took control of Ocheretyne, a town on the high ground thanks to a local breakthrough in April, before sustaining an advance all the way to Pokrovsk. In July, Ukrainian forces were unable to hold the line and abandoned two unfinished defensive lines. Indeed, since December 2023, Ukrainian army is preparing new defensive positions everywhere in the country. First, they dug a defensive line on the Ukrainian side of Dnipro river, two lines on the Zaporizhia and other lines from the border between Poland and Belarus to Kyiv, Tchernihiv, Sumy and Kharkiv. This fortification program however, had several problems. Already, the lack of prior preparation did not leave time for engineers to develop new solid lines. On the Pokrovsk front, 5 lines were dug, with in common networks of trenches, anti-tank ditches and dragon’s teeth to stop the tanks. However, these were almost always incomplete. The reason? Lack of application of orders, corruption, lack of commitment of the brigades to prepare their lines of withdrawal and lack of material means, including excavators to dig ditches and trenches. In addition, the Russian army could easily follow the railways and roads, where the lines stopped. The lack of defensive preparation after Avdiivka and the 2014 defensive line is one of the main reason Russia progressed in 2024. In August, Russian forces eventually took control of Hrodivka and Novohrodivka, the last towns before the agglomeration of Pokrovsk and its twin city of Myrnohrad.
Despite the fact many thought Russian army would try to enter Pokrovsk after it successes from Ocheretyne to Novohrodivka, they did not enter the city changing their direction to the south. Why? Because they saw the opportunity of collapsing the whole south-Donetsk frontline and waging urban fighting in a city as big as Pokrovsk would have cost a lot to Russia. Pokrovsk agglomeration has 100 000 thousands inhabitants, this is bigger than Bakhmut for which Russia fought in 2023. While they advanced in Avdiivka, Russian forces were making a costly offensive in Marinka and Novomykhailivka. In this town, they lost more than 300 tanks and armored vehicles in just 6 months according to @OSINTua X account, a Ukrainian soldier fighting in a drone team which was present there at the time. After securing Marinka and Novomykhailivka in February and April, Russian forces entered another Donetsk suburb, Krasnohorivka. However, the offensive there was not as successful as the one in the Pokrovsk direction. Russia was unable to make significant progress, losing thousands of men and hundreds of military equipment thanks to 10-year-old defenses. The rapid progress north of Kourakhove in August 2024 opened the way to the collapse of Ukraine’s south-Donezk defenses. After securing the town of Kostiantynivka (west of Novomykhailivka), Russian forces gained a foothold north of the city of Vuhledar, “the castle”. This city lies on high ground with high-rise buildings, a mine and an industrial complex at the junction of the southern and eastern directions. Held by the 72nd mechanized brigade for more than 2 years, this city was a strategic defensive position, known for the Russian defeat when they tried to take the town in March 2023 (130 destroyed vehicles). At the end of September, Russia captured Vuhledar and broke through the south-Donetsk frontline.
When they were facing Pokrovsk city and the third Ukrainian defensive line, Russian forces turned their axis to the south; they took control of Ukrainsk, then followed the Krasnohorivka-Pokrovsk railway and pushed north. In October, they nearly encircled Selydove, the last big town south of Pokrovsk, which fell without much fighting. At the same time, they entered abandoned Hyrnik and Kurakhivka, north of the Vovotcha lake. At the end of 2024, they entered Shevchenko, a small town south-west of Pokrovsk, making progress northwestwards, to the town of Udachne, west of Pokrovsk. At the same time, after Vuhledar fell, Russian forces made a small breakthrough to Velika Novosilka, the town where Ukraine’s 2023 counter-offensive began and where two Zaporizhia defensive lines are beginning. In October, it was clear the new objective was not Pokrovsk city, but Kourakhove, an industrial town commanding the whole south Donetsk frontline. The city fell in the last days of 2024, after a Russian offensive from the east and the south.
In 2024, the main Russian effort pushed the frontline 35 km from Avdiivka to Pokrovsk and Marinka to Kourakhove. The Russians clearly won the Donetsk battle and secured the city and the strategic Mariupol-Donetsk railway. In 2024 in total, Russia occupied 3 200 square kilometers, increasing the total occupied area to 18.14% of the country. This represents an additional 0.54% of Ukraine’s total territory coming under Russian control during the year. In the south Donetsk direction, Russia took control of 2 500 km2, thus 78% of the whole Russian progress this year was made in this direction. This offensive has, however, been costly for both sides. Based on Naalsio Twitter account, a well knwown OSINTer counting Russian and Ukrainian losses for the trustful War Spotting team, Russia lost 2142 pieces of equipment, with 1755 of them destroyed, including 444 destroyed tanks and 1013 destroyed Armored Fighting Vehicles. At the same time, Ukraine lost 505 pieces of equipement, with 372 of them destroyed, including 85 tanks and 124 Armored Fighting Vehicles.
What happened elsewhere on the frontline
The southern part of the frontline remained mainly inactive. On the Dnipro frontline of Kherson oblast, Ukraine put an end to the Krinky operation after losing more than 788 soldiers according to official Ukrainian sources. This cross-river operation lasted from October 2023 to July 2024 and managed to divert Russian forces for months, which sustained heavy losses in their counter-offensive against Ukrainian drone teams. After that operation, Russia continued an intense campaign of retaliatory airstrikes on the Ukrainian side of the river and carried out dozens of drone strikes on Ukrainian civilians in Kherson. On the southern frontline, both sides conducted long-range strikes deep into ennemy’s territory against air defense and other military assets. On the frontlines, Russia took back most of what was lost during the 2023 Ukrainian counter-offensive in Robotyne south of Orikhiv and south of Velika Novosilka.
In the central and northern part of Donetsk oblast, Russia entered the town of Toretsk in August but faced resistance with many Ukrainian counterattacks, before taking control of most of Toretsk and its twin city of New York in December 2024. In Chasiv Yar they also took 6 months to reach the canal, the main fortification line between Bakhmut and Chasiv Yar and 6 months to consolidate some position across it on the other side. In Siversk and Lyman, Russia was unable to advance and failed with numerous offensives there. These frontlines are beginning to be very solid, with dug-in positions and a good defensive organisation. In the Kharkiv-Luhansk frontline, Russia managed to reach the Oskil river in Senkove south of Kupyansk after months of offensive, thus cutting the Kupyansk-Lyman front in two parts, Russian forces also crossed the Oskil river near Dvorichna in a small section.
Cross-border operations
Since 2022, the long Russo-Ukrainian border (700 km) has been a sleeping frontline (while the current frontline measures 950km of which 600 are active, while the rest is along the Dnipro river). Both sides are conducting some operations, like the Russian Volunteers fighting for Ukraine did in Belgorod and Bryansk in May 2023. In May 2024, Russia launched a cross-border operation to capture territory. The magnitude of this operation was exaggerated; it was not meant to advance to Kharkiv city. A new russian corps, the “Northern corps” entered Kharkiv oblast from Belgorod, fighting north of Lyptsy and Vovchansk. The operation managed to divert some Ukrainian forces from the Donbass but was mainly an infantry operation for an attrition fight.
In August 2024, while rumours of a russian offensive on Sumy were circulating, Ukraine general staff launched a successful cross-border offensive, taking control of the town of Sudja and 1 000 km2 of Kursk oblast. This operation surprised many, but one more time, its objectives were over exaggerated. It was not meant to take control of Kursk nor the Kurchatov Nuclear Power Plant, but to occupy Russian soil, capture conscripts and put pressure on western allies to fasten their “red lines” on the use of missiles directly on Russian territory. After 5 days of progress, Ukrainian forces were defeated in front of Korenevo and Belitsa, thus stopping their progress. Russia then began numerous counter-offensives, with one main success when they pushed south of Korenevo in October. Since that time, the Kursk frontline has been stabilized despite daily mechanized and infantry assaults. In total, Ukraine took control of around 1 000 km2 of Russia, but after losing ground – Russia moved tens of thousands of soldiers to the area, including North-Korean soldiers – Ukraine still controlled around 470 km2 at the end of 2024.
The military strategy
2024 showed us two main strategies that differ from the first two years of war. The frontline is well established, the gray zone is small, the terrain is mined, most frontline town or city is destroyed, there are trenches everywhere, and solid static positions are the deepest ones. Russia’s initial strategy against old minefields and positions fortified between 2014-2022 along the frontline was big mechanized assaults. This was costly but necessary against prepared firing positions and well-built defenses. After taking control of most of the 2014 line, it was easier for Russia to advance. They began assaults with small, mobile teams of 5 to 10 soldiers, infiltrating cities and positions against overwhelmed Ukrainian defenders. Then, they switched between these two strategies, always with an airstrike and artillery campaign previously. On the other side, Ukraine is facing a lack of men and ammunition. When Russia is attacking, Ukraine is forced to conduct a retrograde defense. Note that while there were territorial advances there was no Russian breakthrough because the situation, despite the fact that it was complicated sometimes, remained under the control of the Ukrainian army, and the Russian army did not have the means and the will to conduct a breakthrough, which would force it to quickly move its logistics, which earned it several defeats in 2022.
Generally speaking, the Ukrainian strategy is based on the defense of cities and the preparation of defense lines. And this is exactly, where the Russian army manages to win battles: it bypasses the cities, isolates the Ukrainian logistics, and then penetrates using small groups of infantry. This strategy has proven itself throughout 2024.
Air and Naval campaign
2024 saw the increase of strikes of different types for both sides. First, the game changer of 2024 is the guidance kit for the FAB 500/1500/3000 bombs. This particular old bomb Russia has in storage from Soviet times is guided to its target in a distance of 40 to 70 km by a fighter jet. According to official data from the Ukrainian government, it is estimated that between 100 and 150 strikes with guided bombs are carried out every day across the entire front. In addition, the Russian army carries out almost daily strikes by Iranian-made Shahed drones, sometimes accompanied by conventional or even hypersonic ballistic missiles. In November, Russia for the first time used the hypersonic Oreshnik missile, that can be equipped with a nuclear warhead. Russia targeted ammunition depots, critical infrastructure (above all on the energy system), training bases, air bases, air defense and naval bases, with some strikes on civilian assets like hospitals or schools sometimes directly, and sometimes indirectly (air defense debris).
Ukraine also began a bigger strike campaign across Crimea and the Russian territory. It managed to target ammunition depots in Russia, training centers in occupied Ukraine and Russian oil and gas facilities from Sochi to Kazan with drones, domestically produced missile prototypes, American ATCMS and Franco-British Storm Shadow (after the interdiction was lifted in November). The Ukrainian air force sustained losses in airports but still did some interventions, with some AASM (French bombs) strikes among other kinds of airstrikes. In 2024, the Russian navy – facing the increase of the use of Ukrainian naval drones – was less active than previous years, mostly leaving Crimea to mainland Russia. Ukraine’s naval drones are becoming more powerful and numerous and can now embark missiles and other drones, in the first days of 2025, a Ukrainian naval USV with missiles on board downed a Russian attack helicopter south of Crimea.
What to expect for 2025 ?
For Ukraine, 2025 will be probably more difficult and important than 2023 and 2024. First, the military situation is still difficult in the eastern part of the country, especially in the south Donetsk direction. It is highly possible that Russia will try to take control of both Pokrovsk and the Kramatorsk-Sloviansk agglomeration. They will first try to cut Pokrovsk from its supply chains before eventually capturing the city. Most likely, they will furthermore completely occupy Toretsk and Chasiv Yar, before advancing further towards Kostiantynivka, the key city before Kramatorsk. We cannot rule out Russia deploying a secondary axis to Dnipro, Zaporizhia oblasts and the Oskil frontline, that runs between Charkiv and Luhansk regions. The main objective of Putin for 2025 will probably be to secure the Donbas, meaning the full control of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. Currently, Russia controls 99% of Luhansk oblast, 3.46% of Kharkiv oblast, 0.5% of Mykolaiv oblast, 72% of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts and 57% of Donetsk oblast (To realize the Novorossia plan – Russian control from Kharkiv to Odesa – at the moment rather seems unlikely. With the arrival of Donald Trump, there will be probably be discussions, maybe even negotiations between both warring parties. Trump is unpredictable, and what he will decide might change the course of the war. However, it is too early to say if Ukraine and Russia are willing to end the war with the current status quo. This is in the idea of eventual talks that Ukraine will try to maintain its presence in Russia as long as possible. 2025 could bring bigger surprises than 2024.
Bibliography/Further reading :
https://x.com/naalsio26/status/1867679792314642914
https://x.com/KofmanMichael/status/1875568044648583213
Short Biography :
Clément Molin is a student at ILERI Lyon of International Relations. He is following the war in Ukraine and other conflicts on his X account (55 000 followers). He is the co-founder of the think tank Atum Mundi, that specializes on following international relations, diplomacy and armed conflicts…
